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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In September 2000 we submitted our research report, "Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital
Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing," to the U.S. Trade Deficit Review
Commission. The findings from our study were then incorporated in their final report, The u.s.
Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and Recommendations for Action. Our original study
examined, in depth, the relationship between capital mobility and threats of capital mobility on
the union organizing process and outcomes. In the spring of 2000 the Commission contracted
with us to complete a follow-up study to further examine plant closings and capital mobility in
the aftermath of union organizing victories and the impact of capital mobility threats on the first
contract process and outcomes. Through surveys, personal interviews, documentary evidence,
and the use of electronic databases, our Cornell University research team was able to collect
detailed data on the extent, nature, and impact of plant closings and plant closing threats for 156
of the 193 elections won by the union in our original random sample of more than 400 NLRB
certification election campaigns that took place between January 1, 1998 and December 31,
1999. By further examining the relationship between capital mobility and the first contract
process, this study adds further corroboration of our earlier findings on the devastating impact
that capital mobility and the threat of capital mobility have had on the ability of American
workers to exercise their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining.
Highlights of the first contract portion of our study include:
. As a result of the pervasive and effective nature of plant closing threats during the
certification election process, the majority of certification election victories and
subsequent first contract campaigns are concentrated in less mobile industries such as
health care, passenger transportation, education, retail, and other services. Only 39
percent of first contract campaigns occur in more mobile industries such as
manufacturing, wholesale distribution, and freight transportation.
. Despite the shift to less mobile industries and the higher win rate in those industries,
capital mobility and threats of capital mobility continue to have a significant impact on
the first contract process and outcomes. Twenty-five percent of employers in mobile
industries continue to make plant closing threats after the certification election is won,
both at the bargaining table and in written and verbal communication with individual
workers in the bargaining units being organized. In 14 percent of campaigns in mobile
units the employer made direct threats to shut down and move to another country, most
often Mexico. First contract rates average only 50 percent in mobile industries where the
employer made post-election plant closing threats compared to an overall first contract
rate of 65 percent.
. Twelve percent ofthe employers in the first contract sample did shut down all or part of
their facilities after the election. Of those shutdowns, 67 percent had made threats to shut
down the facility during the organizing campaign. In 9 percent of the campaigns in our
first contract sample post-election plant closings occurred before the union was able to
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bargain a first agreement. In another 3 percent of the cases, plant closings occurred
shortly after the first contract was settled.
. Plant closing threats during the first contract campaign do not appear to be in any way
related to the financial condition of the company. Instead they are highly associated with
employer anti-union animus. Sixty-six percent ofthe employers who made plant closing
threats during the first contract process had run aggressive anti-union campaigns before
the certification election and at least 73 percent ran aggressive anti-union campaigns after
the union won the election including a combination of discharges, harassment,
interrogation, promises, threats, and unilateral changes in wages, benefits and working
conditions. Plant closing threats during the first contract campaign were also linked with
more aggressive employer opposition at the table, including engaging in surface
bargaining and delaying tactics and bargaining hard over union security issues.
. First contract rates dropped precipitously when plant closing threats occurred in the
context of aggressive employer opposition. The first contract rate averaged as high as 86
percent in the 14 percent of contract campaigns where the employer did not use any anti-
union tactics after the certification election. First contract rates, however, dropped to 63
percent in all campaigns with threats and 46 percent in campaigns in mobile industries
where the employer used five or more anti-union tactics after the election. In campaigns
in mobile industries where the employer used ten or more anti-union tactics, including
plant closing threats, the first contract rate dropped even lower to 20 percent.
. Unions were able to win only 44 percent ofthe elections and achieve first contracts in 66
percent of all elections won. This means that, of the 79,277 voters who participated in
the elections in our organizing sample, only 36,706 (46 percent) were in units where the
union won the election and only 29,075 (36 percent) gained coverage under a collective
bargaining agreement. Thus fewer than 40 percent of all workers who participate in
NLRB certification elections are able to gain coverage under a collective bargaining
agreement.
. For those workers who succeed in winning the certification election and first contract, the
gains in rights, benefits, wages, and protections are both fundamental and significant, if
not in many cases tranformative. For the overwhelming majority ofthe first contracts in
our sample these gains include wage increases averaging 17 percent over the life of the
agreement, basic union rights such as grievance and arbitration, just cause for discipline,
and paid release time for union activity, the right to refuse work and grievable anti-
discrimination language, and improvements in holidays, sick leave, vacation and health
and pension benefits.
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Introduction
In May 2000, Cornell University was asked by the U.S. Trade Deficit Review
Commission (USTDRC) to conduct an in-depth study examining the relationship between
capital mobility, worker insecurity, union organizing, and wages. The first phase of that study,
an analysis of the impact of capital mobility on private sector union certification election
campaigns in the U.S., was completed in September 2000, and findings from our report "Uneasy
Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing," were
incorporated in the USTDRC's November 2000 report to Congress and President Clinton, The
US. Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and Recommendations for Action (Bronfenbrenner
2000).
This report presents findings from the second phase of our study, an analysis of the
impact of capital mobility on private sector first contract campaigns. I This study also follows up
on earlier research on first contract campaigns conducted by Bronfenbrenner in the late 1980s
and mid-1990s, which permits us to track changes in the nature and process of first contract
campaigns since 1986 (Bronfenbrenner 1994; 1997).
As we documented in our report submitted to the USTDRC this fall, throughout the last
decade the increasingly rapid pace of global capital mobility, and the job dislocation and
corporate restructuring that follows in its wake, has fostered a climate of intense economic
insecurity among U.S. workers. This rising sense of economic insecurity has effectively served
to hold down wage demands and wage increases even during a period of economic expansion,
IComell research assistants who worked on the first contract study include Anne Sieverding, Robert
Hickey, Tim Murch, Hilary Rhodes, Elizabeth Chimienti, and Kate Rubin.
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low unemployment, and tight labor markets. As stated in our earlier report, "not only are
individual workers afraid to ask for significant wage increases in the uneasy terrain of America's
'shifting workplaces,' that same specter of capital mobility haunts the union organizing process
for unorganized workers" (Bronfenbrenner 2000: 8). Overall, more than half of all employers
made threats to close all or part of their facilities during the organizing drive. The threat rate was
significantly higher, 68 percent, in mobile industries such as manufacturing, communication, and
wholesale/distribution than the 36 percent threat rate in relatively immobile industries such as
construction, health care, education, retail, and other services.
This high rate of plant closing threats during organizing campaigns occurred despite the
fact that in recent years unions have shifted the focus of their organizing activity away from the
industries most impacted by trade deficits and capital flight, such as apparel and textile,
electronics components, food processing, and metal fabrication, where plant closing threats
average more than 70 percent. Instead, unions are concentrating their resources in less mobile
sectors of the economy such as health care and social services, where plant closing threats
average less than 30 percent.
Our organizing study found that not only are threats of plant closing an extremely
pervasive component of employer campaigns, they are also very effective. The 32 percent
election win rate associated with campaigns in mobile industries where the employer made plant
closing threats is significantly lower than the overall win rate of 51 percent in units where no
threats occurred. Our study also found that threats of plant closing were unrelated to the
financial condition ofthe employer, but rather were a function of the extreme atmosphere of anti-
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union animus that penneates private sector organizing in the U.S. today. More than three
quarters ofthe campaigns where threats occurred also involved aggressive legal and illegal
employer behavior such as discharges for union activity, electronic surveillance, illegal unilateral
changes in wages or benefits, bribes, threats to refer undocumented workers to INS, promises of
improvement, and promotion of union activists out ofthe unit (Bronfenbrenner 2000).
From our previous research on first contract campaigns, we know that plant closing
threats and other aggressive anti-union behavior do not stop when the union wins the certification
election campaign. In fact, the majority of private-sector employers continue to resist union
efforts to bargain a first contract by using a broad range of legal and illegal tactics. These
include captive audience meetings, discharges for union activity, threats, and surveillance, as
well as an absolute refusal to bargain, surface bargaining, or extremely hard bargaining on issues
vital to the union. In our 1993-1995 study we found that 18 percent of all employers made plant
closing threats after the election was won and that 12 percent of employers followed through on
threats made during the organizing campaign and shut down their operations before a first
contract was reached. Another 5 percent shut down the plant after the first contract was settled
(Bronfenbrenner 1994; 1997).
Our intent in this study is to assess how the impact of capital mobility on the organizing
and first contract processes has evolved over time by detennining how many of the employers in
our original organizing sample went on to close the facility in the aftermath of a union organizing
victory and how capital mobility and threats of capital mobility impact the first contract process
today. With this infonnation we can then examine capital mobility and capital mobility threats
Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers. Wages, and Union Organizing/Part II +Page 3
during the first contract process in the context of company structure and characteristics,
bargaining unit demographics, and employer behavior before and after the organizing campaign,
as well as the broader implications ofthese findings on U.S. worker insecurity and wages in the
global economy.
Research Method
The first contract study is a follow-up to our original surveys oflead organizers from a
random sample of 600 NLRB certification elections.2 The sample was derived from data
compiled by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) of all NLRB single-union certification
election campaigns in units with 50 or more eligible voters that took place in 1998-1999. Lead
organizers in these campaigns were mailed surveys asking them a series of questions about plant
closings and threats of plant closings, along with questions on election background, organizing
environment, bargaining unit demographics, company characteristics and tactics, labor board
charges and determinations, union characteristics and tactics, and election and first contract
outcomes. Surveys were completed either by mail or by phone. In-depth follow-up phone
interviews were also conducted for all cases where plant closings or threats of plant closings
were reported by the organizers to have played a role in the organizing process.
By the time the organizing phase of the study was completed in September 2000, we had
received completed surveys for 407 certification election campaigns out of our total random
20ur organizing study focused solely on those campaigns that actually went through to an NLRB
certification election. This means that these data do not include either those units where plant closings or plant
closing threats caused the union to withdraw their petitions before the election was held or units where the plant
closings or plant closing threats resulted in organizing campaigns never getting off the ground.
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sample of 600 campaigns. In the weeks after our report on the organizing study was submitted to
the USTDRC we received six additional completed surveys bringing our total responses for the
organizing sample to 413, which is a 69 percent response rate. The first contract sample was
based on the 193 campaigns in the election sample where the union won the election or a follow-
up second election. In addition to the data on company and union characteristics, bargaining unit
demographics, and employer behavior during the organizing campaign already collected in the
organizing study, follow-up surveys were sent to the union representative responsible for the first
contract campaign to collect additional data on union and employer behavior, bargaining process,
and bargaining outcomes during the first contract campaign. Of the 193 cases in the first
contract sample we received completed surveys in 156 cases for a response rate of 80 percent.
Follow-up phone interviews were conducted for all cases where plant closings or threats
of plant closings were reported by the union representatives to have played a role in the first
contract process. In these interviews organizers were asked detailed questions about the nature
of the plant closing threats, how the threats were carried out, the frequency of the threats, and the
availability of any documentary evidence. Supporting documentation was collected from lead
organizers, whenever possible, in cases where plant closing threats took place.
As part of the original organizing study, we had already conducted computerized database
searches for each case in the sample to determine the parent corporation, any foreign sites or
locations, the countries in which the firm's customers and suppliers are located, and the firm's
global and U.S. employment totals. In addition, we used the AFL-CIO UNICORE database,
financial filings, newspaper and trade journal reports, and reports from union organizers to
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identify whether or not there is a current collective bargaining agreement in another unit orunits
at the location where the representation election took place and any other units or sites ofthe
parent corporation.
To gauge the financial condition ofthe publicly-held firms in the sample, we used annual
and quarterly Securities and Exchange Commission reports to identify key financial indicators
such as annual revenue, net income, earnings per share, and changes in these measures over the
past several years. For privately-owned firms, we relied on computerized corporate and
periodical databases such as Lexis-Nexis and Dun and Bradstreet to acquire similar information
on the company's financial condition. For comparable financial data for the non-profits in the
sample, we utilized data from 990 forms that we had requested from the Internal Revenue
Service for each ofthe non-profit companies in our sample. For all cases, we utilized financial
statements, credit reports, and news articles to identify recent events and trends that had impacted
the firms in the sample to understand more fully the current challenges, opportunities, and
difficulties facing the company at the time ofthe election, such as bankruptcy, massive layoffs,
or corporate mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers.
A comparison of the first contract campaigns where we have survey responses with the
total sample indicates no bias in terms of industry, unit, union, or geographical distribution when
compared to the total population of single union certification election wins in units with more
than 50 eligible voters for petitions filed in 1993-1995. As with the total population, the first
contract campaigns in our sample are concentrated in service and maintenance and
nonprofessional units in non-profit and service-sector industries where union certification
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election win rates are highest. The overall first contract rate for all elections in the original
organizing sample is 66 percent and for the first contract sample is 65 percent. However, since
fewer than two years have gone by for more than a quarter of the elections in the organizing
sample and the union and employer are still bargaining for the first agreement in 16 percent of
the campaigns where the union won the election, the 74 percent first contract rate for elections
held in 1998 is a more reliable predictor ofthe actual first contract rate and is consistent with
previous research on first contract rates in units with more than 50 eligible voters (Cooke 1985;
Bronfenbrenner 1994; 1997).
Industrial Sector, Plant Closing Rates, and First Contract Outcome
As shown in Table 2, there are significant differences between the economic sectors and
industries where union organizing activity is concentrated and the economic sectors and
industries where most first contract campaigns take place. As we learned in our earlier research,
47 percent of all organizing activity is concentrated in more mobile industries such as
manufacturing, wholesale distribution, and communications. However, because the election win
rate averages only 34 percent in those industries, we find that only 39 percent of all first contract
campaigns in our sample are in mobile industries, including manufacturing (22 percent),
wholesale distribution (6 percent), and freight transport (1 percent). None of the cases in our first
contract sample are the most mobile manufacturing industries such as electronics, fuel and
chemical processing, and garment and textiles. Not only are these the industries where union
election win rates are the lowest, these are also the industries which have endured the greatest
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trade deficits with countries such as China and Mexico, and which have suffered the greatest
number of plant closings and production shifts out ofthe U.S. to China, Mexico, and other
countries in Asia and Latin America (Braunstein, Burke, and Epstein 2001; Bronfenbrenner
2001).
Sixty-two percent of all first contract campaigns were in immobile industries such as
health care (31 percent), passenger transport (6 percent), social services (5 percent), hospitality
(4 percent), education (3 percent), and retail, entertainment, and building services (all 2 percent).
First contract rates averaged 70 percent in these less mobile industries compared to 58 percent in
mobile industries.
Although election win rates and first contract settlements have always been higher in less
mobile industries, we find that in the last eight years there has been a significant shift in the
industries where union organizing and first contract gains are concentrated. Thus, where in
1993-1995 54 percent ofNLRB certification election campaigns, 37 percent of election wins
and, 36 percent of first contract gains were in mobile industries, by 1998-1999 only 47 percent of
NLRB election campaigns, 37 percent of election wins and 35 percent of first contract gains were
in mobile industries. This means that of 42,558 workers in mobile industries in our sample who
participate in an NLRB certification election in their industries (of which 66 percent signed cards
or petitions saying they wanted union representation in their workplace ), only 31 percent are
able to achieve the union representation they went through such a struggle to achieve.
In our 1993-1995 study of plant closing threats during first contract campaigns we found
that 18 percent of all employers made threats of full or partial plant shutdowns after the union
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won the certification election. Given the shift away from organizing in more mobile industries
such as apparel and textile, it should be no surprise that overall threats of plant closing during
first contract campaigns dropped to 14 percent. However, as we can see in Table 2, employers
made plant closing threats in nearly a quarter of first contract campaigns in mobile industries.
The first contract rate in those campaigns averages only 50 percent compared to 75 percent first
contract rate in immobile industries where plant closing threats were made during the first
contract campaign.
The Extent and Nature of Plant Closing Threats During First Contract Campaigns
Table 3 summarizes our findings on the nature of plant closing threats during first
contract campaigns. Unlike during the organizing process, where the majority of plant closing
threats are veiled verbal threats expressed by supervisors and top management in captive-
audience meetings and supervisor one-on-ones, a significant percentage of plant closing threats
during the first contract process are made directly to the union bargaining committee at the
bargaining tabIe. Of the 14 percent of all campaigns where employers made plant closing threats
during the first contract campaign, 27 percent include specific unambiguous threats at the
bargaining table and 41 percent include veiled verbal threats at the bargaining table. Nine
percent involve specific unambiguous threats in writing and 23 percent involve specific
unambiguous verbal threats made during captive-audience meetings and supervisor one-on-ones.
Forty-one percent of the threats are veiled verbal threats during captive audience meetings and
supervisor on-one-ones. In 9 percent of all elections with threats, and 14 percent of elections
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with threats in mobile units, the employer made direct threats to move to another country, most
often Mexico.
First contract rates average only 50 percent in campaigns in mobile industries where the
employer made plant closing threats compared to overall first contract rate of 65 percent. First
contract rates are lowest (50 percent) in units where the employer made clear unambiguous
threats in writing or at the bargaining table.
Consistent with the findings from our 1993-1995 first contract study, follow-up
interviews with the lead negotiators for the first contract campaign reveal that these threats are of
a slightly different tone than threats during the organizing campaign. This reflects the fact that
the first contract process is much more complex, with possible outcomes ranging from no
contract, to a weak contract, to a strong contract. In the organizing process, where the union and
the employer struggle for the hearts, minds, and votes of individual workers, threats of plant
closing are an extremely effective way to individually and collectively convince workers to vote
against the union even ifthey sincerely want union representation. In the first contract process
the employer can undermine workers' support for the union by threatening to close the plant, but
the union can go beyond the individual voter to pressure the employer to reach an agreement. At
the same time, plant closing threats can weaken bargaining unit resolve to hold out for a strong
agreement.
Several ofthe union representatives we interviewed report that employers simply
followed through on their original threat during the organizing drive that they would refuse to
operate in a union environment. For some employers this meant filing election objections and
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absolutely refusing to bargain with the union, reiterating that they would shut down rather than
be forced to sign a union agreement. Others focused on how, now that the union had won the
election, the company was re-evaluating operations and considering transferring work to non-
union facilities or contracting out bargaining unit work. For example, during the original UNITE
organizing drive at Goya Foods of Florida, the workers were told by Mary Ann Unahue,
president of the Goya Warehouse, "she would never allow a union into her office or into the
company" and that she would not recognize the union and ''would not negotiate with the union
even if it won the election" (Cullen 2001: 5-7). Workers were also told by Unahue that ifthe
union won the election their work would be contracted out to private subcontractors or the
company "could close and leave the state" (Cullen 2001: 9).
Despite these threats the majority ofthe employees in the warehouse and drivers unit
voted for the union in October 1998, followed by another election victory in the sales and
merchandising employees unit in November 1998. As promised, after the election was won
Goya refused to recognize the union and bargain an agreement. The threats to shut down or
contract out bargaining unit work also continued after the election when Frank Unahue
(President of Goya Foods of Puerto Rico and one ofthree shareholders in the Goya Florida
warehouse) told sales employees that if they continued rallies and protests in support of the union
Goya could lose its account with Winn-Dixie supermarkets and "employees could suffer because
they would lose their jobs" (Cullen 2001: 13). These threats were coupled with numerous other
labor law violations including harassment, interrogation, and discipline of union activists, refusal
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to recognize union representatives and bargain with the union, and withdrawal ofrecognition of
the union.
In February 2001, NLRB Administrative Law Judge Lawrence W. Cullen issued a
decision finding Goya Foods to be guilty of numerous egregious unfair labor practice violations
including "threatening employees with the elimination of their jobs, or the subcontracting oftheir
work, ifthey engage in union activities" (Cullen 2001: 33). Today bargaining at Goya Foods
remains at impasse and there is little hope that a first contract will be settled anytime soon.
Similarly, in early 1998, eighty-five drivers at Sygma Network in Georgia began
organizing with the Teamsters union. Sygma Network is a subsidiary of Sysco Food
Corporation, the largest marketer and distributor of food service products in North America. By
a narrow margin, the drivers voted to certify the union and, in June 1998, began bargaining for
the first agreement. During negotiations, the employer threatened that, if the union did not back
off and let the company run things the way they wanted, the company would shut down. Sygma
subsequently closed the unionized facility in December 1999 and shifted the work to another,
non-union location (Plant Closing Threat Appendix: Case 217).
Equally common was the threat that the employer might go out of business if the union
succeeded in bargaining the kind of agreement it was attempting to reach. For example, during
the UNITE organizing campaign at Dreison International, an electric motor manufacturer in
Cleveland, Ohio, the employer made repeated threats during captive-audience meetings and
supervisor one-on-ones that the business was very competitive and could be done anywhere.
After the union won the election, Dreison continued to make veiled verbal threats in captive-
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audience meetings, individual conversations, and at the bargaining table, that it could move work
to Mexico and that the work could be done anywhere. The employer also threatened that the
union campaign could put the company out of business and it did not have the resources for a
contract (Plant Closing Report Appendix: Case 608).
As we found in the organizing study, in the most mobile multinational companies, just
the existence of sites and operations in other countries acted as an unspoken threat both at the
bargaining table and in individual conversations with workers. While in many of these cases the
possible threat of moving operations out of the country was never clearly articulated, the
possibility of plant closings and production shifts to Mexico and overseas overshadowed the
entire first contract negotiation process. In still other cases, such as the USW A campaign at
Tower Automotive, the threat of moving out of the country was clear and unambiguous. Tower,
an auto parts manufacture in Milan, Tennessee with sites and operations all over the world,
including Mexico, began to make plant closing threats during the first stages of the organizing
campaign and continued to make veiled verbal threats at the bargaining table. Specifically, the
employer's attorney made vague threats about "looking south" at the beginning of the bargaining
process. As the parties began to discuss economic issues in bargaining, the employer made more
specific threats about looking for plants in Mexico (Plant Closing Threat Appendix: Case 578).
These threats of plant closing were not limited to factories and other more mobile
industries. They occurred in non-profit and service-sector companies as well. For example,
workers at Riverside Nursing Home, a Massachusetts subsidiary ofLFA Management, were
subjected to routine threats of plant closing during the organizing campaign and the first four
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months of bargaining. Both in individual one-on-one conversations with supervisors and in
discussions at the bargaining table the employer told the workers that it couldn't "afford a union.
We're not making any money. We'll have to shut down and ship all the patients out of the
nursing home" (Plant Closing Threat Appendix: Case 378).
In the most extreme cases, the plant closing threats during the first contract campaign led
to the union withdrawing from the unit or losing a decertification election, as bargaining unit
members began to question the ability of the union to reach a first agreement without severely
risking their job security. For example, during the original UFCW organizing campaign at
Rainbow Foods in Rochester, Minnesota, the employer ran a fairly moderate anti-union
campaign during the organizing drive which did not include any plant closing threats. After the
election, however, the employer made repeated veiled threats at the bargaining table stating that
the company was losing money and would have to close if the union continued with its demands.
Unable to make much headway at the bargaining table, the union took a settlement back to the
members, only to have it voted down. Eventually the union withdrew and no first contract was
ever reached (Plant Closing Threat Appendix: Case 499).
Unions only filed unfair labor practice charges on the plant closing threats in 9 percent of
the units where threats were made during the first contract campaign. More than a quarter of
those who decided not to file charges against the employer felt it was not necessary to file since
the union was going to achieve a first contract anyway. Forty-seven percent felt that they did not
have a strong enough case to win an unfair labor practice charge before the NLRB. Five percent
did not file charges because they felt that they would lose the unit anyway because of a plant
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closing, decertification, or inability to get the employer to the bargaining table. None ofthe
cases where the union filed charges resulted in a final Board determination in the union's favor,
once again reinforcing why union representatives are so hesitant to file charges regarding plant
closing threats. Even in cases such as Goya Foods, where the NLRB found the employer guilty
of multiple egregious unfair labor practice charges during both the organizing and first contract
campaigns, once the election had been certified the only available NLRB remedies were
reinstatement and back pay for workers discharged for union activity and a posted order to
"recognize, and upon request, meet and bargain in good faith with the union" (Cullen 2001: 35).
There is no first contract arbitration and there are no financial penalties, criminal penalties, or
punitive damages, even for employers who repeatedly and flagrantly ignore bargaining orders
and continue to absolutely refuse to recognize and bargain with the union.
Plant Closings During First Contract Campaigns
Even though the majority of first contract campaigns are concentrated in immobile
industries where actual plant shutdowns would seem less likely to occur, we found that in 12
percent of the units where the union won the certification election there was a full or partial plant
closing after the election. In 9 percent of the cases in our sample post election plant closings
occurred before the union was able to achieve a first agreement and another 3 percent occurred
less than two years after the first contract was settled.
The plant closings are spread across a diverse set of industries and bargaining units. Four
cases are in warehouse and wholesale distribution, two are in manufacturing, one is in health
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care, three are in business and other services, and one is in retail. Three quarters of the plant
closings are in mobile industries and 25 percent are in immobile industries.
In 67 percent of units where the plant closed after the election, the employer had directly
threatened during the organizing campaign to shut the plant down ifthe union won and then
proceeded to actually follow through on its threat after the election was won. For example,
during the VA W organizing campaign at Libralter Plastics, owners, managers, and supervisors
made repeated threats that the plant would close and the work would be moved to a sister plant in
Wixon, Michigan. After the election, the owner refused to recognize or bargain with the union,
even after repeated bargaining orders were issued by the NLRB. Eventually the owner told the
employees that he "would close before he would deal with a union" and then he sold the contract
for the work to the new owner, keeping the building, property, and equipment in his own hands
but not being responsible for the work. The contractor, O.E.M. Erie, Westland Division, did
agree to bargain with the union and a first contract was reached in January 2000. Less than a
year later, in December 2000, the new owner shut down operations and the company reverted
back to the original owner of Libralter Plastics (VAW 2001; Plant Closing Appendix: Case 430).
Corporate Structure and Company Characteristics
Tables 4 and 5 provide insight into the corporate structure and company characteristics of
the workplaces where private-sector first contract campaigns are concentrated. These data reveal
that, although the majority of union election victories are in service- sector units with fewer than
200 eligible voters, the companies where these units are concentrated are neither small nor
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localized. Seventy-eight percent are subsidiaries oflarger parent companies, 38 percent are
multinational corporations with foreign sites and operations, and more than a third of the
companies in the first contract sample report annual revenue in excess of $1 billion.
First contract campaigns in mobile industries are particularly concentrated in large
multinational companies. Ninety percent of campaigns in mobile industries involve subsidiaries
of larger parent companies and more than 60 percent of the companies in our sample have sites
and locations in other countries.
Notably, 55 percent ofthese "mobile" companies are privately-held corporations, making
it much more difficult for unions to obtain strategic information about company finances and
operations. First contract rates are considerably lower in privately held companies in mobile
industries (49 percent) than in publicly-held (73) percent, particularly in campaigns where the
employer made plant closing threats (44 percent).
However, in contrast to our findings regarding certification election win rates, first
contract rates are higher in large multinational corporations than in smaller companies with all
sites and locations in the U.S. This may be because many ofthe larger publicly-held
multinationals are much more likely to have unionized sites and locations in the U.S. and other
countries, and thus are less committed to an absolute "union :6:-ee"policy.
Bargaining Unit Demographics
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Given the much higher certification election win rates in units with a majority of women
and/or workers of color, it is no surprise that women and people of color are highly represented
in our first contract sample. As shown in Table 6, only 12 percent of all first contract campaigns
in our sample had no women in the unit and only 8 percent had no workers of color in the unit.
Fifty-eight percent of the first contract campaigns had at least 50 percent women and 38 percent
had at least 75 percent women, while 42 percent had a majority of workers of color and 28
percent had at least 75 percent workers of color.
As would be expected, the proportion of women in the unit is significantly lower in more
mobile industries such as manufacturing, freight transport, and wholesale distribution. In these
industries more than a quarter ofthe first contract campaigns had no women in the unit and more
than three-quarters had a majority of men in the unit.
However, the proportion of workers of color and non-English speaking workers remains
quite high in mobile units. Thirty-seven percent of first contract campaigns in mobile industries
had a majority of workers of color and 25 percent had more than 75 percent workers of color --
most of whom were men. Nineteen percent of workers in first contract campaigns in mobile
industries had a language other than English as their primary language.
The workplace demographics data summarized in Table 6 also reveal that a very high
percentage of workers organizing today have irregular work schedules. This is particularly true
for those workers employed in mobile industries. Eighty-six percent of the overall first contract
sample and 95 percent of first contract campaigns in mobile units have at least some workers in
the unit with irregular work schedules. On average, 18 percent of workers in mobile units work
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ten to twelve hour shifts, 30 percent work evening and night shifts, 15 percent work rotating
shifts, and 30 percent work weekends. Twenty-six percent of workers in all first contract
campaigns and 34 percent of workers in mobile units average more than five hours a week
overtime.
Employer Practices Prior to and During the First Contract Campaign
Table 7 presents data on company practices before and after the election and the impact
of those practices on first contract outcomes. Although the employer had run aggressive anti-
union campaigns (using more than five anti-union tactics) before the election in 51 percent ofthe
units and had made threats of plant closings before the election in 40 percent of the units in the
overall first contract sample, the percentage who used more than five anti-union tactics during
the organizing campaign increased to 66 percent in first contract campaigns with post-election
plant closing threats. This reflects the fact that over two-thirds of the employers who
aggressively opposed the union after the election had been equally aggressive during the
organizing campaign. Similarly, employers who threatened to close the plant after the election
were much more likely to engage in hard bargaining (41 percent), refusing to reach agreement on
any major issues, than those who did not threaten to close the plant during the first contract
campaign.
As expected, employer resistance to recognizing and bargaining with the union was even
greater in more mobile units. Two-thirds ofthe employers in mobile industries used more than
five anti-union tactics before the election and 17 percent used more than ten. After the election,
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20 percent made changes in ownership or structure, 23 percent made major cutbacks in staff, 13
percent increased their use of temporary and contract workers, 12 percent contracted out
bargaining unit work, and 8 percent shut down the unit. A third of employers in mobile
campaigns engaged in hard bargaining and 10 percent absolutely refuse to start bargaining even
after the union had been certified by the NLRB.
Employer Anti-Union Tactics During the First Contract Campaign
As we have learned through our research on first contract campaigns over the last decade,
employer opposition does not stop with the election victory. The overwhelming majority of
employers continue their anti-union campaign after the election is won. In fact, if we compare
our findings for employer behavior in 1998-1999 with our findings from our 1993-1995 study,
we find that in the last decade employer anti-union activity during first contract campaigns has
increased in intensity (Bronfenbrenner 1997). Union first contract rates may have remained
steady at 65 to 70 percent, but rather than being a reflection of reduced employer opposition it
appears to be a function of more sophisticated and aggressive union campaigns.
As shown in Table 8, employers today are much more likely to use management
consultants, refuse requests to start bargaining, conduct captive-audience meetings and
supervisor one-on-ones, discharge workers for union activity, assist the anti-union committee and
help organize a decertification campaign than they were in 199301995. While in 1993-1995 only
9 percent of all employers used five or more anti-union tactics during the first contract campaign,
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in 1998-1999 36 percent used five or more anti-union tactics and 11 percent used ten or more
anti-union tactics.
Similar to what we found in the organizing study, most of the employer threats during the
first contract campaign occurred in the context of other aggressive anti-union tactics (Table 8).
In campaigns with threats, 68 percent hired an outside union consultant, 23 percent refused
requests to start bargaining, 36 percent continued mandatory captive-audience meetings, 59
percent continued supervisor one-on-ones, 46 percent proposed major concessions, 46 percent
made unilateral changes in wages, benefits and working conditions, 50 percent discharged union
activists, 59 percent assisted the anti-union committee, and 32 percent organized a decertification
effort. In 73 percent of the first contract campaigns with threats, the employer used more than
five anti-union tactics and in 36 percent the employer used more than ten anti-union tactics. The
threat rate is 47 percent in units where the employer ran an aggressive anti-union campaign using
more than ten anti-union tactics.
Plant closing threats during the first contract campaign were even more closely associated
with aggressive employer opposition in mobile industries. Employers used five or more anti-
union tactics in 71 percent of campaigns with threats in mobile industries and ten or more anti-
union tactics in 36 percent of the campaigns. Workers were discharged for union activity in 64
percent of the campaigns with threats in mobile industries and the employer helped organize a
decertification campaign in 43 percent.
Plant closing threats were also linked with more aggressive employer opposition at the
table, including engaging in surface bargaining and delaying tactics (50 percent of all campaigns
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with threats), and bargaining hard over union security issues (68 percent of all campaigns with
threats and 86 percent of campaigns with threats in mobile industries).
As would be expected, first contract rates dropped precipitously when plant closing
threats occurred in the context of aggressive employer opposition. The first contract rate
averaged 86 percent in the 14 percent of all first contract campaigns and the 12 percent of first
contract campaigns in mobile industries where the employer did not use any anti-union tactics.
First contract rates, however, dropped to 63 percent in all campaigns with threats and 46 percent
in campaigns in mobile industries with threats where the employer used five or more anti-union
tactics during the campaign. In those campaigns where the employer used ten or more anti-union
tactics, including plant closing threats, the first contract rate dropped even lower to 55 percent in
all campaigns and 20 percent in campaigns in mobile industries.
Unions filed unfair labor practice complaints regarding the employer tactics listed in
Table 8 in 36 percent of all first contract campaigns and 62 percent of campaigns with threats.
Complaints were issued in 36 percent of all campaigns where unfair labor practices were filed,
and in 39 percent of campaigns with threats and 71 percent of campaigns in mobile industries
with threats.
The final Board ruling was in the union's favor in only 18 percent of all cases where the
union filed charges. However, it increased to 31 percent in campaigns with threats and 43
percent in campaigns with threats in mobile industries. Given that it is extremely difficult for the
union to win a favorable Board decision except in the most egregious cases of employer
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violations, these data reveal the extreme degree of employer opposition faced by workers
attempting to bargain for their first agreement in more mobile industries.
Final Status of Units in the Organizing and First Contract Studies
Tables 9 and 10 outline the final status of the organizing and first contract campaigns
included in the first and second phases of our study. As shown in Table 9, a total of79,277
voters participated in the 413 elections in the original organizing sample, of which, on average,
66 percent signed petitions or cards before the election expressing their desire to be represented
by a union. However, in the context of aggressive employer opposition including frequent
threats of job loss and plant closure, unions won only 44 percent of the elections and achieved
first contracts in 66 percent of all elections won. Thus of the 79,277 voters who participated in
the election, only 36,706 (46 percent) were in units where the union won the election and only
29,075 (36 percent) gained coverage under a collective bargaining agreement. This means that
fewer than 40 percent of all workers who participate in NLRB certification elections are able to
gain union representation within two years of the election taking place. Nor is it a short process.
We found, that on average, it took just under three months (82 days) between the petition and the
election and more than 351 days between the election and when the first contract was settled.
For the units where the union lost the election, unions filed election objections in 21
percent of the campaigns. Objections were upheld and reruns scheduled in 28 percent of the
cases where the objections were upheld. However, the union win rate in rerun elections averages
less than one-third. Unions also went back for a second election in 32 percent ofthe elections
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lost but were able to win the second election in fewer than 40 percent of the second elections in
the sample.
Unions were able to bargain a first agreement in 30 percent of all the elections in the
original organizing sample and 66 percent of elections won. For those units where a first
contract still has not been reached, election objections are still pending in 2 percent of the
campaigns and the employer is refusing to bargain and/or has declared impasse in 12 percent of
the campaigns. In 15 percent of the campaigns where a first contract has still not been reached
the union lost certification because the employer shut down or contracted out the work force, in 3
percent the union is out on strike, in 10 percent the union withdrew, in 8 percent the union was
decertified, and in 5 percent the union lost certification after the NLRB determined that the union
had lost majority status. The union is still bargaining in 16 percent of all elections won and in 46
percent of campaigns where they have yet to achieve a first agreement. Thus the final first
contract rate should increase by several percentage points once unions are able to achieve a
contract settlement in some of the units where they are still in negotiations.
For those units where the union was able to achieve a first contract, the gains negotiated
by the union were quite significant. Twelve percent of negotiators surveyed reported that the
first contract they bargained was one of the best in the industry, 42 percent reported the contract
was better than most in the industry, 33 percent reported that the first contract was typical for the
industry, and only 13 percent reported the contract was somewhat below average for the industry.
As described in Table 10, unions were able to bargain a wage increase in 94 percent of all
first contract campaigns with a 17 percent increase in the average wage over the life of the
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agreement and a 15 percent increase in the median wage. In 44 percent of the units the union
was able to eliminate the merit system and in 41 percent the union was able to bargain the
establishment of a step system to determine wages, as well as longevity increases. Forty percent
included improvements in sick leave, 43 percent improvements in holidays, and 30 percent
improvements in paid vacation benefits.
Close to 100 percent of all the first contracts in the sample included a grievance and
arbitration procedure, 90 percent had just cause for discipline, and 60 percent included paid
release time for stewards to process grievances. Despite the significant proportion of cases in
right-to-work states, 63 percent ofthe contracts have a union shop provision and 12 percent have
an agency shop, leaving fewer than only 25 percent with full or partial open shop provisions.
Unions also made significant gains in arbitrable language to enforce or expand on
protective legislation. Seventy-one percent of the first contracts had grievable anti-
discrimination language, 43 percent included the right to refuse unsafe work, and 51 percent had
guaranteed parental leave. Thirty-six percent were able to achieve limits on subcontracting, 48
percent achieved successorship language, and, perhaps most significant of all, 10 percent
successfully bargained for neutrality and/or card check protection for unorganized units ofthe
same employer.
On the whole, first contract gains in mobile industries were very similar to the overall
first contract gains summarized above. Yet, with the exception of the right to refuse work, paid
release time for stewards, and improvements in vacations and holidays, the percentages for each
of the contract gains were 1 to 10 percent lower in mobile industries, reflecting the greater
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challenge of bargaining in industries where the threat of capital mobility, whether directly
expressed or merely understood, haunts the negotiation process.
Conclusion
The findings from our first contract follow-up study provide important insight into the
enormous challenges facing private-sector workers who attempt to exercise their legal rights to
freedom of association and collective bargaining in the U.S. In particular, the findings reveal the
pivotal role played by capital mobility and the threat of capital mobility in the organizing and
first contract process. Although at the start of campaigns 66 percent ofthe workers participating
in union elections express clear interest in union representation through the signing of petitions
or cards, only 36 percent actually gain coverage under a collective bargaining agreement.
For those who succeed in winning the certification election and first contract, the gains in
rights, benefits, wages, and protections are both fundamental and significant, ifnot in many
cases, transformative. Thus it should be no surprise that private-sector decertification rates are
extremely low, and that po11ingconsistently reveals that 90 percent of unionized workers desire
to remain unionized (BNA Plus 2000; Freeman and Rogers 1999).
Yet, as our research has found, the road to winning a private-sector certification election
and bargaining a first agreement is so fraught with fear, harassment, threats, coercion, and
intimidation it is as if workers must enter a war zone simply to exercise their legal and moral
rights to union representation. Most powerful of all is the fear of job loss, plant closing, or
corporate restructuring that, thanks to a combination of employer threats and a general climate of
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constantly shifting capital and investment, penneates the union organizing and bargaining
process. Not only do the majority of all employers, and as many as 68 percent of employers in
mobile industries, threaten to close all or part oftheir facilities if workers attempt to organize a
union, 14 percent continue the threats after the election is won, and 12 percent actually follow
through on the threats and shut down after the union has been certified. Employers make these
threats in conjunction with a broad range of extremely effective legal and illegal anti-union
tactics including discharges, harassment, unilateral changes, promises, interrogation,
surveillance, and bribes during both the original certification election campaign and the first
contract campaign that follows.
As our findings show, the majority of employers make these threats with no intention of
following through and actually shutting down if the union wins the election or bargains a first
agreement. Otherwise the actual plant closing rate would be significantly higher than 12 percent
of all elections won. Instead, employers make threats during the organizing and first contract
campaign because they have found them to be an extremely effective mechanism, particularly
when coupled with other aggressive anti-union tactics, to undennine worker support for the
union and to weaken union bargaining power.
The costs of capital mobility and threats of capital mobility during the organizing and
first contract process go well beyond the individual certification elections or first contracts lost.
We have watched unions give up on organizing entire sectors ofthe economy, such as
electronics, garment and textile, and many other light manufacturing facilities, both because they
are so much more difficult to organize and because, once organized, it is all too likely that they
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will be shut down and moved out of the country. We have also seen hundreds ofthousands of
workers give up on trying to organize a union in their workplace, despite their desire for union
representation, simply because the risks of job loss are too great. And we have seen how the
economic insecurity that haunts the organizing and first contract process permeates the entire
workforce, holding down wages and restraining workers from demanding safer and more human
work schedules and working conditions.
Nowhere is this more true than in the nation's most mobile industries such as apparel and
textile, auto parts, electronics, telecommunications, steel fabrication, food processing, and certain
business services. For many workers in those industries, any organizing is quickly stifled, with
the first veiled threat from the employer that the plant might close or work might be shifted out
of the country ifthe unions come in.
In a climate of escalating capital mobility, it is only natural that many unions are turning
toward less mobile sectors of the economy. But what of the millions of workers employed in the
nation's most mobile industries? A half a century ago these were the workers that helped create
the industrial labor movement that brought tens of millions of American workers and their
families out of poverty and into the middle class. Included in this group were large numbers of
new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and also many African-Americans.
Despite all the talk about the "new economy," America still has, and always will have,
millions of workers employed in the manufacturing sector. Today, whether they work in
garment shops in the nation's largest cities, textile and food processing plants in the rural South,
electronics component plants in Southern California, or metal fabrication plants in the Midwest,
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these are the American workers hardest hit by globalization. These are also the workers that
have shared least in the economic boom ofthe last decade, but instead have found themselves
working longer and harder, in more and more dangerous jobs, with declining pay, few benefits,
and little security. Many are recent immigrants from Latin America and Asia, or women, or
both, and few have the skills or education needed to transfer to better jobs in the "new economy."
These are the workers who would benefit most from the kinds of economic and non-economic
benefits that our research -has shown first contracts provide. Yet, in a climate where capital
mobility and the threat of capital mobility are driving unions to seek targets in less mobile
industries and forcing workers to choose between asking for improvements in wages and benefits
or holding on to the only source of income they have, these are the workers most likely left
behind.
It is a high price for U.S. workers, their families, and communities to pay. Globalization
cannot and should not be stopped. However, through a combination oflabor law reform and
labor side agreements in trade and investment treaties, the right to organize and collectively
bargain can be shielded from the worst effects of global capital mobility. This can be done both
by restraining employer campaigns through legislating card check neutrality protections and
providing punitive and criminal penalties for flagrant employer interference with the organizing
and bargaining process, and by requiring first contract arbitration for all cases where the
employer refuses to bargain in good faith with the union and reach an agreement. It can also be
accomplished by trade and investment policies which provide sanctions for those corporations
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who use foreign trade and the threat of capital mobility to interfere with the legal right to
freedom of association and collective bargaining in the U.S. and around the globe.
The stakes for our nation are high. Absent these changes in labor law and trade and
investment policy, the benefits of the global economy will accrue to a select group of investors,
owners, and managers at the expense of workers, their families, and their communities.
Particularly as we face the possibility of a serious economic downturn, it becomes all the more
important that we seek economic, trade, and labor policies that work to the benefit of workers
and the unemployed in all countries, not just the investors, owners, and shareholders in the
world's most powerful and wealthy multinational corporations.
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TABLE 1: SURVEYS RECEIVED BY FIRST CONTRACT RATE, MOBILITY, AND UNION
Total Returned Returned Returned
Surveys Received Surveys With Surveys Surveys With
Plant Closing Without Plant Plant
Threats Closing Closings
Threats
# % # % # % # %
All First Contract Campaigns 156 1.00 22 .14 134 .86 12 .08
Elections held 1998 73 .47 14 .64 59 A4 6 .50
Elections held 1999 83 .53 8 .36 75 .56 6 .50
First Contract not Achieved 54 .35 9 A] 45 .34 10 .83
First Contract Achieved 102 .65 ]3 .59 89 .66 2 .17
Elections held 1998 49 .67 8 .57 41 .70 2 .33
Elections held 1999 53 .64 5 .63 48 .64 0 .00
Mobile Industries 60 .39 14 .66 46 .34 9 .75
Immobile Industries 96 .67 8 .36 88 .66 3 .25
Union
AFSCME 6 .04 0 .00 7 .05 0 .00
AFT 2 .05 0 .00 2 .02 0 .00
CWA .01 0 .00 .01 0 .00
HERE 4 .03 0 .00 4 .03 0 .00
JAM 3 .02 0 .00 3 .02 0 .00
IBEW 5 .03 3 .14 2 .02 0 .00
IBT 28 .18 2 .09 26 .]9 4 .33
JUOE 3 .02 0 .00 3 .02 .08
LJUNA 3 .02 0 .00 3 .02 0 .00
PACE 5 .03 2 .09 3 .02 0 .00
SEIU 30 .19 3 .14 27 .20 2 .17
UAW 12 .08 2 .09 10 .08 2 .17
UBC .0] .05 0 .06 0 .00
UFCW 9 .06 .05 8 .00 0 .00
UNITE 4 .03 4 .18 0 .00 0 .00
USWA 17 .11 2 .09 15 .11 2 .17
Other AFL-CIO 8 .05 0 .00 8 .06 0 .00
National Independents 6 .04 .05 5 .04 0 .00
Local Independents 2 .01 .05 .01 0 .00
-n-
TABLE 2: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Threats Rate
Industrial Sector
Manufacturing .22 .74 .27 .83 .18 .57 .74 .43 .83 .18
Aerospace .00 .00
Auto and auto parts .04 1.00 .09 1.00 .33 .10 1.00 .14 1.00 .33
Building materials .01 1.00 .00 .00 .02 1.00 .00 .00
Electronics and electrical products .00 .00
Food processing .01 1.00 .00 .00 .03 1.00 .00 .00
Fuel and chemical processing .00 .00
Garment and textiles .00 .00
Household and recreational products .01 .50 .00 .00 .03 .50 .00 .00
Industrial equipment and machinery .03 .75 .09 1.00 .50 .07 .75 .14 1.00 .50
Metal production and fabrication .05 .50 .00 .00 .13 .50 .00 .00
.
...
Plastics products .00 .00t"
Printing .01 1.00 .00 .00 .02 1.00 .00 .00
Rubber products .01 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Wood and paper products .04 .83 .05 1.00 .17 .10 .83 .07 1.00 .17
Other manufacturing .02 .67 .05 .00 .33 .05 .67 .07 .00 .33
Mining .00 .00
Construction .01 1.00 .00 .00 .02 1.00 .00
Warehouse and wholesale distribution .10 .27 .18 .00 .27 .25 .27 .29 .00 .27
Warehouse .04 .33 .05 .00 .17 .10 .33 .21 .00 .17
Wholesale .06 .22 .14 .00 .33 .15 .22 .07 .00 .33
Retail .02 .33 .09 .50 .67 .02 .00 .07 .00 1.00
Transportation .10 .69 .09 1.00 .13 .02 1.00 .07 1.00 1.00
Freight transport .01 1.00 .09 1.00 1.00 .02 1.00 .07 1.00 1.00
Passenger transport .06 .89 .00 .00 .00
Waste disposal .03 .20 .00 .00 .00
TABLE 2: INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Threats Rate
Communications .00 .00
Utilities .01 1.00 .05 1.00 .50 .03 1.00 .07 1.00 .50
Services .54 .68 .32 .57 .08 .10 .33 .07 .00 .17
Building services .02 1.00 .00 .00 .00
Business services .05 .71 .05 .00 .14 .05 .67 .07 .00 .33
Education .03 .60 .05 1.00 .20 .00
Entertainment .02 1.00 .05 1.00 .33 .00
Health care .31 .69 .14 .33 .06 .00
Hospitality .04 .50 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Laundries .01 1.00 .05 1.00 .50 .00
Social services .05 .63 .00 .00 .00
Other services .01 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00,
... Mobility of Industryf"
Mobile .39 .58 .64 .50 .23 1.00 .58 1.00 .50 .23
Immobile .62 .70 .36 .75 .08 .00 .00
TABLE 3: NATURE OF PLANT CLOSING THREATS DURING THE FIRST CONTRACT CAMPAIGN
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats
Plant Closing Threats .14 .59 1.00 .59 1.00 .23 .50 1.00 .50 1.00
Specific unambiguous written threats .01 .50 .09 .50 1.00 .02 .00 .07 .00 1.00
Specific unambiguous verbal threats in .03 .60 .23 .60 1.00 .05 .67 .21 .67 1.00
meetings
Specific unambiguous verbal threats at .04 .50 .27 .50 1.00 .05 .00 .21 .00 1.00
bargaining table
Veiled verbal threats in captive audience .06 .67 .41 .67 1.00 .08 .60 .36 .60 1.00
meetings
Veiled verbal threats at bargaining table .06 .67 .41 .67 1.00 .10 .50 .43 .50 1.00
Threats to move to another country .01 1.00 .09 1.00 1.00 .03 1.00 .14 1.00 1.00
Mexico .01 1.00 .09 1.00 1.00 .03 1.00 .14 1.00 1.00
Union Filed ULP Charges on Threats .05 .38 .09 .50 1.00 .08 .20 .07 1.00 1.00
Disposition: *
,
Union withdrew charges before .01 (.13) .00 .00 (.00) .02 (.20) .00 .00 (.00)....
f' Charges dismissed/no complaint issued .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Charges settled before complaint .01 (.13) .00 .00 (.00) .02 (.20) .00 .00 (.00)
Complaint issued on at least some .03 (.50) .50 .05 (.50) .00 1.00 .05 (.60) .33 .07 (1.00) .00 1.00
Charges settled after complaint .03 (.50) .50 .05 (.50) 1.00 1.00 .02 (.20) .00 .00 (.00)
Final determination in union's favor .01(.13) .00 .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Final determination not in union's favor .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Why Charges Were Not Filed**
Confident going to settle a contract .03 (.26) .80 .23 (.26) .80 1.00 .03 (.15) .50 .14(.15) .50 1.00
Felt the case was not strong enough .06 (.47) .67 .41 (.47) .67 1.00 .13 (.62) .63 .57 (.62) .63 1.00
Not worth the effort - going to lose .01 (.05) .00 .05 (.05) .00 1.00 .00 (.00) .00 .00 (.00)
Other .03 (.21) .25 .18 (.21) .25 1.00 .05 (.23) .33 .21 (.23) .33 1.00
*Proportions in parenthesis are based on cases where ULPs were filed
**Proportions in parenthesis are based on cases where no ULPs were filed
TABLE 4: CORPORATE STRUCTURE, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Corporate History
Years company has been in operation 35.50 25.29 27.50 18.00
Years under current ownership 20.84 15.25 13.55 10.58
Years at present site 28.42 21.09 21.97 18.14
Ownership structure
Subsidiary oflarger parent .78 .65 .73 .56 .13 .90 .61 .79 .55 .20
Not subsidiary .22 .68 .27 .67 .18 .10 .33 .21 .33 .50
Non-profit .29 .73 .09 .50 .04 .02 .00 .00 .00
For-profit .71 .62 .91 .60 .18 .98 .59 1.00 .50 .24
Publicly-held .39 .67 .27 .67 .12 .43 .73 .36 .60 .19
Privately-held .33 .58 .64 .57 .23 .55 .49 .64 .44 .27
Global Structure
,
U.S.-based, all sites U.S. .34 .53 (.72) .50 .55 (.64) .21 .37 .36 (.71) 043 .33 (.63) .27
"'"1" U.S.-based multinational .30 .63 (.66) Al .67 (.54) .20 .48 .66 (.52) .57 .63 (.33) .28
Foreign-based multinational .08 1.00 (.63) .00
- (.59) .00 .13 1.00 (.52) .00 .00
Canada .03 1.00 .03 1.00 .00 .00 .00
Latin America/Caribbean .00 .00 .00
Asia .00 .00 .00
Europe/Mediterranean .04 1.00 .05 1.00 .00 .10 1.00 .00 .00
A ustralialNew Zealand .01 1.00 .01 1.00 .00 .02 1.00 .00 .00
Foreign sites and locations .41 .70 (.62) .50 .73 (046) .17 .63 .74 (.32) .64 .67 (.20) .24
Canada .05 .63 .09 .50 .25 .03 .00 .07 .00 .50
Latin America/Caribbean .02 1.00 .05 1.00 .33 .02 1.00 .00 .00
Asia .02 .33 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Africa .01 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Europe/Mediterranean .03 .80 .05 1.00 .20 .03 1.00 .07 1.00 .50
AustralialNew Zealand .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Mixed Europe/N. America/Australia .03 .75 .05 1.00 .25 .07 .75 .07 1.00 .25
Mixed North and South America .03 .75 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Mixed/Global .22 .71 .27 .67 .17 .45 .82 .43 .67 .22
TABLE 4: CORPORATE STRUCTURE, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Foreign customers .43 .69 (.63) .50 .73 (.46) .16 .70 .71 (.28) .64 .67 (.20) .21
Canada .05 .63 .05 .00 .13 .05 .33 .07 .00 .33
Latin America/Caribbean .03 .50 .14 .33 .75 .03 .00 .14 .00 1.00
Asia .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Africa .01 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Europe/Mediterranean .02 .67 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00
Australia/New Zealand .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Mixed EuropeIN. America/Australia .03 1.00 .05 1.00 .20 .08 1.00 .07 1.00 .20
Mixed North and South America .03 .80 .05 1.00 .20 .03 .50 .07 1.00 .50
Mixed/Global .25 .69 .23 1.00 .13 .48 .79 .29 1.00 .14
Foreign suppliers .41 .67 (.64) .46 .60 (.58) .16 .68 .66 (.42) .57 .50 (.50) .20
Canada .04 .67 .05 .00 .17 .02 .00 .07 .00 1.00
I
Latin America/Caribbean .03 .50 .09 .00 .50 .05 .33... .14 .00 .67
;-->
Asia .01 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Africa .01 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Europe/Mediterranean .02 1.00 .00 .00 .02 1.00 .00 .00
AustralialNew Zealand .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Mixed Europe/N. America/Australia .02 .67 .05 1.00 .33 .05 .67 .07 1.00 .33
Mixed North and South America .03 .75 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00
Mixed/Global .26 .68 .27 .83 .15 .52 .74 .29 .75 .13
Any foreign sites, suppliers, or .50 .68 (.63) .62 .69 .17 .81 .68 .79 .64 (.00) .23
customers
*
Number in parenthesis reports the percent win rate where the characteristic did not occur.
TABLE 5: COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Employment
Number of eligible voters in the unit 178.52 142.55 183.62 119.14
50-99 eligible voters .40 .52 .59 .46 .21 .45 .52 .64 .44 .33
100-249 eligible voters .42 .73 .27 .83 .09 .30 .61 .21 .67 .17
250-499 eligible voters .II .71 .09 .50 .12 .18 .64 .14 .50 .18
500 or more eligible voters .06 .90 .05 1.00 .10 .07 .75 .00 .00
Total number of employees at parent 21,886.36 19,474.05 21,585.40 9,512.00
Total number ofUS.-based employees 12,844.31 6,552.47 12,366.86 8,713.10
Financial condition
Excellent .21 .53 .18 .25 .13 .25 .40 .29 .25 .27
.
... Good .43 .71 .46 .70 .15 .42 .60 .36 .60 .20i'>
Fair .32 .66 .36 .63 .16 .27 .81 .36 .60 .31
Poor .05 .57 .00 .00 .05 .00 .00 .00
Annual revenue of parent company $2,721.89 $3,660.48 $3,864.11 $2,984.15
Less than $25 million .26 .56 .32 .57 .18 .19 .27 .29 .25 .36
$25-249.9 million .25 .58 .18 .75 .11 .24 .50 .14 1.00 .14
$250-999.9 million .13 .85 .14 .33 .15 .14 .63 .14 .00 .25
$1-4.9 billion .22 .79 .23 .80 .15 .26 .87 .29 1.00 .27
$5 billion or more .13 .45 .14 .33 .15 .17 .50 .14 .00 .20
Net income $37.30 $52.30 $178.32 $41.88
Negative net income .32 .64 .40 .33 .15 .18 .38 .30 .33 .38
$0
-
.9 million .14 .59 .00 .00 .07 .67 .00 .00
$1
- 24.9 million .26 .75 .13 1.00 .06 .32 .86 .10 1.00 .07
$25 - 99.9 million .13 .75 .20 .33 .19 .18 .63 .30 .33 .38
$100 million or more .15 .61 .27 .75 .22 .25 .64 .30 .67 .27
Percent change in net income in the last
-.12 -.01 .05 -.00year
TABLE 5: COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Region
Northeast .30 .72 .23 .80 .11 .15 .67 .21 .67 .33
Midwest .23 .78 .27 .67 .17 .32 .74 .29 .75 .21
Southeast .20 .48 .27 .33 .19 .33 .50 .43 .33 .30
Southwest .04 1.00 .05 1.00 .17 .05 1.00 .00 .00
West Coast and Mountain States .22 .50 .18 .50 .12 .15 .22 .07 .00 .11
Territories .01 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Unionization
Other organized units at the same site .21 .79 .27 .33 .18 .13 .75 .29 .50 .50
Other organized units at other sites .64 .72 .50 .46 .11 .67 .68 .57 .50 .20
,
oN
'P
TABLE 6: UNIT CHARACTERISTICS, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Wages
Hourly workers .94 .91 .99 1.00
Average wage of hourly workers $10.53 $11.30 $10.59 $10.43
Minimum hourly wage $8.17 $7.88 $8.17 $7.61
Maximum hourly wage $13.89 $14.08 $14.08 $13.61
Salaried workers .06 .09 .01 .00
Average yearly salary $25,971.34 $17,003.35 $26,000.00 $32,000.00
Minimum yearly salary $25,388.20 $13,760.00 $22,000.00 $29,000.00
Maximum yearly salary $50,475.15 $36,866.67 $31,166.67 $33,500.00
Hourly and Salaried Combined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
A verage wage $10.86 $11.16 $10.60 $10.46
A verage wage more than $12/hour .33 .69 (.65) .36 .75 (.50) .16 .37 .64 (.55) .29 .75 (.40) .18
f,. Average wage $8
- $ll/hour .42 .66 (.67) .45 .60 (.58) .16 .43 .69 (.50) .50 .57 (.43) .27?
A verage wage less than $8/hour .25 .64 (.67) .18 .25 (.67) .10 .20 .25 (.67) .21 .00 (.64) .25
Gender
Percent women in unit .51 .43 .23 .26
No women in unit .12 .47 (.68) .18 .50 (.61) .21 .25 .53 (.60) .29 .50 (.50) .27
1- 49 percent women .30 .62 (.67) .36 .63 (.57) .17 .57 .62 (.54) .43 .50 (.50) .18
50-74 percent women .20 .81 (.62) .18 .50 (.61) .13 .12 .57 (.59) .21 .67 (.46) .43
75 percent or more women .38 .66 (.65) .27 .67 (.56) .10 .07 .50 (.59) .07 .00 (.54) .25
Race and Ethnic Background
Percent workers of color in unit .43 .47 .40 .46
Percent African-American .25 .22 .20 .22
Percent Hispanic .14 .23 .17 .21
Percent Asian .03 .02 .01 .03
Percent Native American .00 .00 .01 .00
No workers of color in unit .08 .62 (.66) .05 .00 (.62) .08 .08 .60 (.58) .07 .00 (.54) .20
1-49 percent workers of color .50 .69 (.62) .46 .70 (.50) .13 .55 .73 (.41) .43 .83 (.25) .18
50-74 percent workers of color .14 .62 (.66) .14 .67 (.58) .14 .12 .43 (.60) .14 .50 (.50) .29
75 percent or more workers of color .28 .61 (.67) .36 .50 (.64) .18 .25 .33 (.67) .36 .20 (.67) .33
TABLE 6: UNIT CHARACTERISTICS, PLANT CLOSING THREATS, AND CAMPAIGN OUTCOME
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Percent women of color .24 .23 .12 .14
No women workers of color in unit .23 .47 (.71) .27 .50 (.63) .17 .35 048(.64) .43 .50 (.50) .29
1-49 percent women workers of color .54 .73 (.57) .50 .55 (.64) .13 .55 .70 (.44) .43 .50 (.50) .18
50-74 percent women workers of color .15 .63 (.66) .09 .50 (.60) .08 .08 040(.60) .14 .50 (.50) .40
75percent plus women workers of .08 .75 (.65) .14 1.00 (.53) .25 .02 .00 (.59) .00 .00 (.50) .00
color
Percent recent immigrants .05 .09 .03 .04
Percent undocumented .01 .04 .01 .00
Percent non-English speaking .15 .24 .19 .24
Hours of work
Percent part-time .12 .04 .02 .01
Percent on call, temporary, per diem .08 .11 .07 .15
Percent average more than 5 hrs/wk .26 .34 .34 .42
... Irregular work schedules .86 .62 (.86) .82 .56 (.75) .13 .95 .60 (.33) .93 .54 (.00) .23
-
,
.29 .18Percent work 10-12 hour shifts .14 .36
Percent work evening/night shifts .27 .30 .30 .32
Percent work rotating shifts .12 .17 .15 .21
Percent work weekend shifts .36 .46 .30 .56
Unit Type
Craft .01 1.00 .05 1.00 1.00 .02 1.00 .07 1.00 1.00
Drivers .10 .33 .09 .00 .13 .10 .00 .14 .00 .33
Guards .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Non-professional .09 .86 .05 1.00 .07 .02 .00 .00 .00
Production and Maintenance .33 .69 Al .78 .18 .73 .75 .57 .75 .18
ProfessionallTechnical .14 .73 .09 .50 .09 .02 .00 .00 .00
Service and Maintenance .21 .66 .14 1.00 .09 .02 .00 .00 .00
Wall-to- Wall/Cross Departments .10 .53 .14 .00 .20 .07 .00 .14 .00 .50
Clerical/White Collar .03 .75 .05 .00 .25 .03 1.00 .07 .00 .50
Final unit different from petitioned unit .26 .68 (.65) .23 .80 (.53) .13 .15 .67 (.57) .29 .75 (.40) .44
*
Number in parenthesis reports the percent win rate where the characteristic did not occur.
TABLE 7: COMPANY PRACTICES BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTION
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Practice before election
Threatened to close plant .40 .60 (.69) .64 .71 (.38) .22 .62 .57 (.61) .64 .67 (.20) .24
Number of anti-union tactics 6.21 7.77 7.02 6.64
No anti-union tactics .06 .78 (.65) .05 .00 (.62) .II .02 .00 (.59) .07 .00 (.54) 1.00
More than five anti-union tactics .51 .63 (.68) .64 .64 (.50) .18 .65 .56 (.62) .64 .56 (.40) .23
More than ten anti-union tactics .15 .63 (.66) .23 .80 (.53) .21 .17 .40 (.62) .14 .50 (.50) .20
Practice after election
Changed ownership or structure .14 .64 (.66) .27 .83 (.50) .27 .20 .75 (.54) .29 1.00 (.30) .33
Made major cutbacks in staffing .14 .36 (.70) .18 .50 (.61) .I 8 .23 .36 (.65) .21 .33 (.55) .21
Changes in new hire demographics .03 .00 (.67) .05 .00 (.62) .25 .02 .00 (.59) .07 .00 (.54) 1.00
b.. Made positive changes in management .23 .75 (.63) .36 .88 (.43) .22 .33 .80 (.48) .43 .83 (.25) .30
:-> Increased use of temporary workers .11 .47 (68) .23 .20 (.71) .29 .13 .38 (.62) .29 .25 (.60) .50
Contracted out work .07 .55 (.66) .23 .40 (.65) .46 .12 .43 (.60) .29 .25 (.60) .57
Transferred work out of the unit .04 .33 (. 67) .09 .50 (.60) .33 .07 .25 (.61) .14 .50 (.50) .50
Shut down all or part of the plant .05 .13 (.68) .00 .00 .08 .20 (.62) .00
- (.50) .00
Bargaining never started .11 .00 (.72) .05 .00 (.62) .06 .10 .00 (.65) .07 .00 (.54) .17
Attitudes towards bargaining
Absolute refusal to bargain .10 .13 .05 .00 .06 .10 .00 .07 .00 .17
Hard bargaining .25 .54 .41 .44 .23 .33 .45 .36 .20 .25
Business like confrontation .19 .73 .23 .60 .17 .15 .67 .29 .50 .44
Good-faith bargaining .25 .87 .00 .00 .22 .85 .00 .00
Combination .19 .77 .32 .86 .23 .20 .75 .29 1.00 .33
Bargaining has not yet begun .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
TABLE 8: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR AND PLANT CLOSING THREATS DURING THE CAMPAIGN
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Campaign Tactics
Filed election objections .18 .68 (.65) .18 .75 (.56) .14 .13 .63 (.58) .14 .50 (.50) .25
Hired management consultant .58 .60 (.73) .68 .60 (.57) .17 .57 .47 (.73) .64 .44 (.60) .27
Refused information requests .20 .42 (.71) .50 .64 (.55) .36 .22 .31 (.66) .43 .33 (.63) .46
Refused requests to start bargaining .17 .44 (.70) .23 .60 (.59) .19 .17 .30 (.64) .14 .50 (.50) .20
Refused union representatives .22 .41 (.72) .27 .33 (.69) .18 .22 .23 (.68) .36 .20 (.67) .39
workplace access
Refused paid release time to unit .44 .62 (.68) .59 .62 (.56) .19 .38 .57 (.60) .50 .57 (.43) .30
members
Refused unpaid release time to unit .07 .46 (.67) .09 1.00 (.55) .18 .05 .67 (.58) .07 1.00 (.46) .33
members
Proposed major concessions on .19 .55 (.68) .46 .30 (.83) .35 .22 .39 (.64) .50 .14 (.86) .54
wages and benefits
b.. Continued captive audience meetings .12 .42 (.69) .36 .38 (.71) .42 .15 .44 (.61) .43 .33 (.63) .67
'"
after electionI
Number of meetings 10.89 14.43 14.56 16.50
Mailed anti-union letters .14 .48 (.68) .23 .80 (.53) .24 .12 .43 (.60) .14 .50 (.50) .29
Number of letters 2.70 2.50 2.57 2.50
Distributed anti-union leaflets .15 .54 (.67) .36 .50 (.64) .33 .15 .44 (.61) .43 .33 (.63) .67
Number of leaflets 5.81 3.17 7.00 3.20
Held supervisor one-on-ones .21 .55 (.68) .59 .54 (.67) .39 .30 .39 (.67) .57 .38 (.67) .44
Established Employee Involvement .03 .80 (.65) .00
--
(.59) .00 .02 1.00 (.58) .00
- (.50) .00
Made unilateral changes .30 .50 (.72) .46 .50 (.67) .22 .30 .44 (.64) .36 .40 (.56) .28
Discharged union activists .23 .50 (.70) .50 .64 (.55) .31 .27 .50 (.61) .64 .56 (.40) .56
Number discharged 3.94 4.64 5.19 4.89
Number not reinstated 3.31 3.82 4.50 3.89
Fired workers not reinstated .22 .51 (.69) .50 .64 (.55) .31 .27 .50 (.61) .64 .56 (.40) .56
Promoted pro-union activists .07 .46 (.67) .09 .50 (.60) .18 .05 .33 (.60) .14 .50 (.50) .67
Used bribes or special favors .03 .60 (.66) .00
- (.59) .00 .02 1.00 (.58) .00 - (.50) .00
TABLE 8: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR AND PLANT CLOSING THREATS DURING THE CAMPAIGN
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Used electronic surveillance .05 .43 (.66) .00
--
(.59) .00 .07 .25 (.61) .00
- (.50) .00
Held social events outside work with .03 .75 (.65) .09 1.00 (.55) .50 .05 .67 (.58) .07 1.00 (.46) .33
anti-union message
Assisted anti-union committee .26 .56 (.69) .59 .62 (.56) .32 .32 .42 (.66) .64 .56 (.40) .47
Used free mass media .02 .67 (.65) .05 1.00 (.57) .33 .00 .00
- (.50)
Bought paid time on mass media .01 .50 (.66) .00
- (.59) .00 .02 1.00 (.58) .00 - (.50) .00
Showed anti-union videos .01 1.00 (.65) .05 1.00 (.57) 1.00 .00 .00
- (.50)
Made threats to refer workers to INS .02 .33 (.66) .09 50 (.66) .67 .02 .00 (.59) .07 .00 (.54) 1.00
Involved elected officials .03 .50 (.66) .00
- (.59) .00 .02 .00 (.59) .00 - (.50) .00
Involved clergy .03 .25 (.66) .00
- (.59) .00 .00 .00 - (.50)
Involved community groups .01 .00 (.66) .00
-
(.59)
.00 .00 .00
- (.50)
h..
Helped organize decertification .15 .35 (.71) .32 .43 (.67) .30 .18 .46 (.61) .43 .50 (.50) .55
f- campaign
Threatened to close the plant .14 .59 (.66) 1.00 .59 (.66) 1.00 .23 .50 (.61) 1.00 .50 (.61) 1.00
Filed unfair labor practice charges .03 .00 (.68) .05 .00 (.62) .20 .03 .00 (.60) .07 .00 (.54) .50
against union
Number oftactics used 4.13 7.95 4.25 7.79
No tactics used .14 .86 (.62) .00
- (.59) .00 .12 .86 (.55) .00 - (.50) .00
Five or more tactics used .36 .54 (.72) .73 .63 (.50) .29 .37 .46 (.66) .71 .50 (.50) .46
Ten or more tactics used .11 .29 (.70) .36 .38 (.71) .47 .13 .13 (.65) .36 .20 (.67) .63
Bargaining Tactics
Absolutely refused to bargain .10 .13 (.71) .05 .00 (.62) .06 .10 .00 (.65) .07 .00 (.53) .17
Played one sector of unit off the other .22 .53 (.69) .41 .67 (.54) .26 .25 .60 (.58) .29 .75 (.40) .27
Engaged in surface bargaining .29 .53 (.70) .50 .55 (.64) .24 .33 .45 (.65) .50 .43 (.57) .35
Bargained hard over union security .52 .62 (.69) .68 .53 (.71) .19 .57 .62 (.54) .86 .50 (.50) .35
issues
Repeated used of delaying tactics .34 .60 (.68) .50 .55 (.64) .21 .38 .57 (.60) .57 .50 (.50) .35
TABLE 8: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR AND PLANT CLOSING THREATS DURING THE CAMPAIGN
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent Proportion Percent Proportion Contract Percent
or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat or Mean of Contract or Mean Rate with Threat
Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate Campaigns Rate with Threats Rate
Threats Threats
Granted better wages to workers .08 .75 (.65) .00
- (.59) .00 .05 1.00 (.56) .00 - (.50) .00
outside unit
Declared impasse and implemented .03 .40 (.66) .00
- (.59) .00 .05 .33 (.60) .00 - (.50) .00
final offer
Locked-out bargaining unit workers .00
- (.65) .00 - (.59) .00 .00 - (.50)
Filed charges for bad faith bargaining .03 .20 (.67) .05 .00 (.62) .20 .07 .25 (.61) .07 .00 (.54) .25
Forced union to strike by holding to .04 .33 (.67) .05 1.00 (.57) .17 .05 .33 (.60) .00 - (.50) .00
concessions
ULP's filed on Employer Tactics .36 .53 (.73) .62 .62 (.63) .24 .36 .52 (.63) .54 .57 (.50) .33
Disposition
**
Union withdrew the charges .06(.16) .78 .18 (.31) 1.00 .44 .03(.10) 1.00 .14 (.29) 1.00 1.00
Charges dismissed without .03 (.09) .40 .00 (.00) .00 .05(.14) .67 .00 (.00) .00
complaint issued
Union and employer settled before .08 (.22) .83 .09(.15) .50 .17 .03 (.10) 1.00 .00 (.00) .00
"
complaint
;" Board issued complaint .13(.36) .45 .23(.39) .40 .25 .17 (.48) .50 .36 (.71) .40 .50
Board dismissed union charges .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Union and employer settJed after .07 (.20) .64 .14 (.23) 1.00 .27 .07(.19) .50 .07 (.14) 1.00 .25
complaint
Fired workers reinstated before .03 (.07) .50 .05 (.08) .00 .25 .05 (.14) .67 .07 (.14) .00 .33
contract settled
Final board determination in union's .06 (.18) .20 .18 (.31) .25 .40 .08 (.24) .40 .21 (.43) .33 .60
favor
Final board determination not in .01 (.04) 1.00 .05 (.08) 1.00 .50 .03(.10) 1.00 .07 (.14) 1.00 .50
union's favor
*Number in parenthesis reports the percent win rate where the characteristic did not occur.
** Proportion in parentheses is based on cases where ULPs were filed.
TABLE 9: FINAL STATUS OF UNITS IN ORGANIZING AND FIRST CONTRACT SURVEYS
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion
or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of
Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections First First
Won Lost with without Won with Lost with Contracts Contracts
Threats Threats Threats Threats Won Lost
Number of eligible voters
Average number of voters 191.95 200.58 185.09 208.33 174.68 230.88 194.39 234.48 130.46
Total number of voters 79,277 36,706 42,571 44,166 35,111 18,701 25,465 29,075 8,871
Percent signed cards before petition .66 .71 .62 .66 .65 .71 .63 .69 .62
filed
70 percent or more signed cards .45 .61 .32 .43 .47 .62 .32 .57 .67
Percent union vote .49 .65 .35 .46 .51 .66 .34 .65 .34
0-25 percent .11 .00 .19 .13 .09 .00 .21 .02 .19
26-45 percent .37 .00 .64 .39 .34 .00 .63 .03 .65
46-50 percent .10 .06 .13 .10 .09 .04 .14 .07 .13
51-55 percent .09 .20 .00 .10 .08 .25 .00 .16 .01
56-75 percent .23 .51 .00 .20 .26 .52 .00 .50 .02
More than 75 percent .11 .23 .00 .08 .13 .19 .00 .23 .01
Delay
~Daysfrom petition to election 81.79 85.68 78.71 83.83 79.65 107.28 90.88 76.06 134.09
i"
Days from election to first contract 351.43 343.93 570.75 345.80 355.26 345.80 351.43
Union lost election .56 .00 1.00 .63 .49 .00 1.00 .04 .07
Union filed election objections* .12 .00 .21 .13 .10 .00 .21 .00 .00
Objections upheld and union .00 .00 .00 (.02) .01 .00 .00 .01 (.04) .00 .00
certified
Objections upheld and rerun .03 .00 .06 (.28) .01 .05 .00 .02 (.11) .00 .00
scheduled
Union won rerun election** .01 .00 .01 (.23) .01 .02 .00 .00 (.00) .00 .00
Union lost rerun e1ection** .02 .00 .04 (.62) .01 .03 .00 .02 (.67) .00 .00
Rerun not yet schedu1ed** .01 .00 .01 (.15) .01 .01 .00 .01 (.33) .00 .00
Objections dismissed .05 .00 .09 (.45) .07 .04 .00 .11 (.52) .00 .00
Objections settled .01 .00 .01 (.06) .01 .00 .00 .02 (.11) .00 .00
Objections withdrawn .01 .00 .02 (.09) .01 .01 .00 .02 (.07) .00 .00
Objections pending .01 .00 .01 (.06) .01 .01 .00 .02 (.07) .00 .00
Issued posting but no rerun .01 .00 .01 (.04) .01 .00 .00 .02 (.07) .00 .00
Union went back for second e1ection*** .17 .00 .32 .20 .14 .00 .33 .02 .07
Second election won .02 .00 .03 (.10) .01 .02 .00 .02 (.07) .02 .04
Second election lost .03 .00 .04 (.15) .02 .03 .00 .04(.12) .00 .00
TABLE 9: FINAL STATUS OF UNITS IN ORGANIZING AND FIRST CONTRACT SURVEYS
Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion Proportion
or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of or Mean of
Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections Elections First First
Won Lost with without Won with Lost with Contracts Contracts
Threats Threats Threats Threats Won Lost
Second election still not scheduled .09 .00 .15 (.49) .11 .06 .00 .17 (.54) .00 .03
Union withdrew from second election .03 .00 .05 (.16) .03 .03 .00 .05 (.15) .00 .00
Union won voluntary recognition .01 .00 .01 (.03) .01 .01 .00 .01 (.02) .01 .00
Plant closed before election .01 .00 .02 (.06) .02 .00 .00 .04(.10) .00 .00
Other union won election .00 .00 .00 (.01) .00 .01 .00 .00 (.00) .00 .00
Union won the election .44 1.00 .00 .38 .51 1.00 .00 .96 .93
Election certified .44 .98 .00 .37 .51 .99 .00 .97 .88
Union won first or second election .47 1.00 .04 .39 .55 1.00 .02 1.00 1.00
Union won first contract .30 .66 .02 .23 .37 .61 .00 1.00 .00
Election held 1998 .31 .74 .01 .20 .42 .65 .00 1.00 .00
Election held 1999 .29 .59 .03 .26 .33 .58 .00 1.00 .00
First contract not reached .70 .34 .98 .77 .63 .39 1.00 .00 1.00
Election objections still pending .00 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .02
b.. Union still bargaining .08 .16 .01 .08 .08 .21 .00 .00 .46
;--J Employer refusing to bargain! .02 .04 .00 .02 .02 .06 .00 .00 .12
impasse
Union out on strike .01 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .03
Full or partial plant shutdown .02 .05 .00 .03 .02 .07 .00 .00 .15
Union withdrew .02 .03 .00 .01 .03 .02 .01 .00 .10
Union decertified .01 .03 .00 .01 .01 .04 .00 .00 .08
Union lost majority status .01 .02 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .05
Average wage increase from first .17 .18 .08 .17 .18 .17 .17
contract
Negotiator view of first contract
quality
One of the best in the industry .03 .07 .00 .04 .02 .10 .00 .12
Better than most in the industry .11 .21 .01 .05 .15 .14 .00 .42
Typical of the industry .08 .18 .00 .06 .10 .15 .00 .33
Somewhat below average for industry .03 .07 .00 .03 .04 .07 .00 .13
*Numbers in parenthesis are based on cases where the union filed objections after the election was lost.
**Numbers in parenthesis are based on cases where a rerun was ordered by the NLRB after the election was lost.
***Numbers in parenthesis are based on cases where the union went back for a second election campaign after the election was lost.
TABLE 10: FIRST CONTRACT GAINS
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Proportion or Percent Proportion or Proportion or Percent
or Mean of Mean of First Threat Rate Mean of All Mean of First Threat Rate
All First Contracts with First Contracts with
Contracts Threats Contracts Threats
Contract Gains
Wage Increase .94 1.00 .14 .91 1.00 .22
Percent increase in average wage .17 .15 .16 .19
Percent increase in median wage .15 .16 .17 .23
Elimination of merit .44 .39 .11 .40 .43 .21
Establishment of step system .41 .39 .12 .40 .57 .29
Dues checkoff .93 1.00 .14 .91 1.00 .22
Pro-rated benefits for part-timers .39 .08 .03 .06 .00 .00
Grievance procedure .98 1.00 .13 .97 1.00 .21
Arbitration procedure .97 1.00 .13 .94 1.00 .21
Paid release time for stewards .60 .46 .10 .66 .43 .13
... Improvements in sick leave .40 .39 .12 .29 .43 .30::0
I
Improvements in holidays .43 .46 .14 .49 .57 .24
Improvements in vacation .30 .15 .07 .31 .29 .18
Just cause discipline .90 .92 .13 .80 .86 .21
Defined benefit pension plan .20 .08 .05 .17 .14 .17
Defined contribution pension plan .24 .39 .21 .26 .43 .33
Individual health insurance .62 .69 .14 .60 .57 .19
Dependent health insurance .47 .39 .10 .51 .43 .17
Union shop .63 .69 .14 .63 .71 .23
Agency shop .12 .00 .00 .09 .00 .00
Right to refuse unsafe work .43 .46 .14 .49 .57 .24
Seniority determining factor for promotions .78 .77 .13 .74 .86 .23
Seniority determining factor for layoffs .87 .85 .12 .83 1.00 .24
Parental leave .51 .39 .10 .31 .14 .09
Career ladder/job training program .24 .39 .21 .20 .57 .57
Minimum staffing .09 .08 .11 .00 .00 .00
TABLE 10: FIRST CONTRACT GAINS
All First Contract Campaigns Campaigns in Mobile Industries
Proportion Proportion or Percent Proportion or Proportion or Percent
or Mean of Mean of First Threat Rate Mean of All Mean of First Threat Rate
All First Contracts with First Contracts with
Contracts Threats Contracts Threats
Sub-contracting limits .36 .15 .05 .26 .29 .22
Grievable anti-discrimination language .71 .77 .14 .69 .86 .25
Successorship language .48 .54 .14 .37 .57 .31
Neutrality or card check for other units .10 .08 .10 .09 .14 .33
Negotiator view of first contract quality
One ofthe best in the industry .12 .12 .17 .12 .14 .25
Better than most in the industry .42 .45 .07 .38 .43 .23
Typical of the industry .33 .31 .18 .27 .29 .22
Somewhat below average for industry .13 .13 .15 .24 .14 .13
...
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